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After 1945, the regulation of international financial markets became more intense and 
widespread as part of the system designed to avoid the chaos that had characterised 
international economic relations in the 1930s.   This paper examines how the post-war 
consensus about the usefulness of regulating capital flows evolved after the advent of 
current account convertibility in 1959.  First, an examination of the debate over 
regulating the Eurodollar market will be used to highlight the contrast between European 
attitudes to capital markets compared to the views of the USA and the UK, where the 
differences are not as firm or as reliable as has been portrayed.  The archival evidence 
shows that there were lively concerns about the dangers of the market and vigorous 
internal discussion about intervention as well as regulation in both London and 
Washington, and also among banks themselves.  Nevertheless, both American and 
British regulators resisted introducing controls because the benefits of the market for 
their balance of payments policies outweighed the threats.  This is not to say that the 
British and Americans were opposed to capital controls per se.  Indeed, this was a time 
of deliberate intensification of capital controls in the USA on US$ outflows, and in the 
UK on sterling transactions.  This analysis shows that the traditional story that market 
innovation undermined the effectiveness of capital controls and therefore led to the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system needs to be adjusted to take account of regulators’ 
roles in allowing that innovation to spread, and how the US and UK deliberately used 
the market as part of their response to the imbalances in the international economy in the 
1960s. 
     The next part of the paper develops the history of prudential regulation and 
supervision of international banking that began after the end of the Bretton Woods 
system.  This area has remained a challenge for regulators for much the same reasons 
that were present in the 1970s: problems of enforcement, the privacy of banking 
business, and the primacy of national over international interests.  A second theme of 
the paper, therefore, is the enduring conflict between the desire to have national 
sovereignty over financial markets on the one hand, and the need for supranational 
oversight to ensure consistency and enforcement of prudential supervision and 
regulation in an increasingly global market.  
 
I 
The regulation of international financial markets in the 1950s and 1960s was closely 
linked to the Bretton Woods solution to the ‘trilemma’ or ‘impossible trinity’, which 
explains that maintaining policy sovereignty in the context of fixed exchange rates 
requires imposing limits on international capital flows.1  The over-riding goals of 
national economic growth and full employment as well as the development of welfare 
states after 1945 required that national sovereignty was prioritised over freer capital 
flows.2  Countries with balance of payments deficits used direct controls on outflows 
to avoid relying solely on higher domestic interest rates. Conversely, countries with 
pressures for surplus and inflation used regulations to protect their domestic monetary 
systems from inflows of capital. 
       The terms of the Bretton Woods agreement reflected a broad international 
consensus that freer markets in goods were beneficial for growth, employment and 
incomes overall, but that international financial markets should be closely regulated.3 
While the link between freer trade and growth is fairly well established, there is still 
no such consensus for the link between liberalisation of financial markets and growth. 
It makes sense to assume that freer capital markets will generate a more efficient 
global allocation of investment resources and so provide the best prospects for 
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growth.  However, empirical research has revealed an ambiguous relationship 
between capital account liberalisation and economic growth.4  Crafts has observed 
that there is ‘no evidence that abolishing capital controls per se leads to higher 
growth….But there is quite good reason to believe that financial liberalisation 
significantly increases the risk of a subsequent financial/currency crisis.’5  In 1997 the 
IMF began to consider including capital account liberalisation into its Articles of 
Agreement, but this process was stalled in the wake of the financial crises of the late 
1990s.  In December 2003 Anne Kreuger, Director of the IMF, advised that “Capital 
flows are, in some respects, like antibiotics. Anything capable of doing good is also 
powerful enough to inflict harm when wrongly used. That is not a reason to restrain 
capital flows, though, but to harness them so that they can do most good.” 6  The 
history of international financial regulation is the history of the struggle to identify 
when capital flows were ‘wrongly used’ and the various ‘harnesses’ and their 
outcomes. 
 
II 
     The persistence of global imbalances after current account convertibility led to greater 
reliance on capital controls as a tool to combat short-term balance of payments problems.  
In the UK, controls on a variety of financial and commercial transactions were 
intensified for balance of payments purposes during the 1960s. 7  On the other hand, the 
Bank of England allowed relatively free transactions denominated solely in foreign 
currency as part of the City of London’s traditional business.  This inconsistency 
eventually led to financial innovation that pierced the barrier between sterling and US$ 
transactions within the existing rules.  In 1955 the Midland Bank began to offer higher 
interest for US$ denominated deposits that it then used to ease local liquidity 
constraints.8  This innovation quickly spread and led to a resurgence in British merchant 
banking and also a rush of foreign banks opening offices in London to take part in the 
market.9 Moorgate, where many US banks found premises, became known as 
‘America Avenue’ and the Eurodollar market quickly moved from being dominated by 
British banks to one dominated by American banks in London. 
     The initial regulatory response to the innovation of the Eurodollar market in London 
was to allow the market to grow, although there were misgivings within the Bank of 
England and the Treasury over the potential liquidity and volatility of the market.  The 
Bank of England imposed informal prudential supervision by requesting banks to 
report their monthly Eurodollar balances.  Bankers were also warned personally to be 
cautious about the term structure and liquidity of their Eurodollar business.10  The 
effectiveness of this traditional approach to supervision in the City of London relied 
on a close relationship between the Bank of England and individual bankers, and 
therefore became less sustainable as the market became dominated by American 
bankers less amenable to such ‘moral suasion’.11  
    Rajan and Zingales explain the failure to regulate the Eurodollar market as follows: 
‘It was on British soil, but eventually, many of its players were American. So neither 
country could unilaterally close it down.’12  It is clear from archival and 
contemporary accounts that it was not a lack of cooperation between Washington and 
London that made it impossible to close the market.  Rather the benefits that the 
market generated for both parties stymied efforts by European regulators to close it 
down.  If they had wanted to, the Bank of England could have eliminated the market 
in London unilaterally (in the way that European governments did) by prohibiting the 
payment of interest on non-resident deposits.  A major obstacle to imposing new more 
formal controls in London was the desire to sustain the status of London as an 
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international financial centre. As a report by the Bank of England stated in 1961, 
‘however much we dislike hot money we cannot be international bankers and refuse 
to accept money.’13  Another obstacle to London unilaterally closing the market was 
that it would merely be driven to other off-shore centres with even poorer supervisory 
systems than London.   
      Looking more closely, it is clear that the British regulators’ motives for supporting 
the Eurodollar market are rather more complicated than they are portrayed by 
Helleiner and Rajan and Zingales, whose explanations begin and end with the desire 
to support London as an international financial centre, or Burn, who sees Britain’s 
toleration of the market as the result of the incestuous relationship between the City 
and the Bank of England.14  Certainly at the time it was believed that the international 
activities of the City generated prestige and current account earnings.  On the other 
hand, the Treasury’s intensification of controls on many financial transactions in the 
late 1950s and through the 1960s shows that hurting the interests of the City was not 
an obstacle to imposing controls if they were deemed necessary for balance of 
payments purposes.15  As Burn also notes, of more immediate importance was that 
the growth of the Eurodollar market generated a net inflow of US$ that helped reduce 
Britain’s persistent balance of payments deficits.16  The fact that the dollars attracted 
by Midland Bank reduced the recorded fall in the UK's central reserves in June 1955 
from $US56m to US$6m carried considerable weight in the Bank of England and the 
Treasury.  In a time of balance of payments deficits, the UK did not want to introduce 
new controls on capital inflows.   
     In the US, capital controls on outflows were a major weapon in the battle to rectify 
the persistent balance of payments deficits of the 1960s.  The government imposed a 
series of controls; the IET in 1963, Voluntary Foreign Credit Programme of 1965 and 
reserve requirements on banks in the US accepting funds from their branches abroad 
in 1969.  These policies encouraged the operation of US banks in London and 
enhanced the demand for Eurodollar loans there to finance US MNCs and other 
international borrowers seeking dollar loans.  The outcome of the different regulatory 
environments in the USA and the UK was a reallocation of international banking 
activity.  Britain’s share of world banks’ foreign assets peaked in 1969 at 26% of the 
global total, while the share of the USA fell from 21% to less than 10% from 1966-69.     
      The US Treasury agreed with the Bank of England that there was no immediate 
need for external supervision or new regulation of the Eurodollar market in London.17 
Burn details the slow realization in the USA of the importance of the market and 
confusion over its impact the early 1960s.18  The under-secretary of state for 
monetary affairs, Robert Roosa, told Parsons of the Bank of England early in 1963 
that he ‘was certain that the Eurodollar market would continue to be a feature of the 
international financial situation. It was potentially a vehicle for instability but also an 
important part of liquidity’ at a time when the perceived shortage of international 
liquidity was an important pre-occupation.19  In talks with US banks, Roosa  
reminded them that although there is no question of imposing exchange 
control, they should, in his words, ask themselves whether they are serving the 
national interest by participating in this sort of activity, which adds to the 
volume of short term capital outflow from the US.  Mr. Roosa was not too 
optimistic about the outcome.20
 
Roosa was evidently not as confident about the prospects of moral suasion being 
exercised effectively in the New York market as the Bank of England was in London.  
However, in 1963 some major US and European banks did agree among themselves 
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to restrict the inter-bank market and avoid ‘pyramiding’ of deposits because of fears 
over the market’s stability.21
     At the end of November 1963, a fraudulent food oil scam in the USA (dubbed the 
‘Great Salad Oil Flap’ by The Economist) brought down the broker Ira Haupte and 
generated a series of defaults on Eurodollar loans. This sent a shock through the 
market and brought monetary authorities back to the question of regulation and 
supervision.22  The increasing volume of short-term inter-bank flows raised the 
spectre of the financial crisis of the 1930s but, unlike the 1930s, this did not lead to a 
reversal of policy.23  In London, the system of informal supervision continued.  As 
Cromer told Holtrop of the BIS, ‘if in an individual case it appeared to us that an 
unsound situation was developing, we would then discuss the matter with the bank in 
question’.24    Governor Daane of the Fed worried about the possibility that ‘unsound 
lending’ might to lead to a chain of defaults that would cause a banking crisis similar 
to that of 1933.25  He was reassured, however, by arguments that the Eurodollar 
market represented a small proportion of banks’ total liquidity and that the market 
was sensitive to geographical concentration.26  Like the Bank of England, the Fed 
used its contacts to obtain more information about the market by asking a small 
number of leading US corporations why and how they used the Eurodollar market, but 
they did not put any obstacles in the way of such transactions.27   
     Burn is critical of the late interest the Fed took in the Eurodollar market, noting 
that it was only in 1960 that they sought to gather intelligence about how the market 
worked in Europe.28  The result of this study led them to become more hostile to the 
market and they considered ways to insulate the US from the Eurodollar market ‘by 
prohibition or patriotic persuasion’ or by altering incentives or reserve requirements.  
The main goal was to curtail the evasion of tight domestic monetary policy through 
the Eurodollar market.  By 1967, they concluded that  
a) ‘Prohibition might stimulate innovation in methods of avoidance. 
b) Efforts at persuasion might bring counter-productive psychological 
reactions. 
c) It would not be sound policy to make what might have to be a permanent 
change in the framework of reserve requirements for transitory reasons’.29 
 
If the Fed wanted to support an integrated world money market, they could not 
introduce new reserve requirements on foreign deposits of US banks abroad.  On the 
other hand, reserve requirements would ‘help us to manage domestic monetary policy 
effectively – and, incidentally, help simplify other people’s management of their 
domestic and external monetary policies’.  Two years later, the Fed opted for 
domestic priorities and in September 1969 imposed a 10% reserve requirement on net 
liabilities to foreign branches of US banks in excess of the average amounts 
outstanding in May 1969.  This discouraged foreign branches of US banks from 
repatriating US$ to their head offices and thus undermining US tight money policy. 
The Fed estimated that 30% of foreign branch resources were used to supply parent 
offices in 1969 but that in 1970 this had reduced to 2.7%.30  
      At the beginning of 1968, the Fed Board considered injecting additional funds to 
the market through the Fed-BIS swap mechanism to hold down Eurodollar interest 
rates.31  As part of this study, it was revealed that the Fed had intervened in the 
market in the recent past, but by 1968 most in the Fed were against any further action.  
In April, the Fed publicly acknowledged that the Eurobond market was an integral 
part of their balance of payments policy: ‘It has always been clear that part of the 
required adjustment in international payments would have to come through increased 
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European financing of capital investment in Europe and elsewhere’.32 In 1968 new 
issues of securities in foreign markets by US corporations soared to $2.1b from 
$US450m in 1967.33  The US money supply was insulated from the market by reserve 
requirements in 1969 but offshore borrowing of US$ by foreign companies was 
encouraged to ease the pressure on domestic capital markets. 
      Although taking steps to insulate the US economy, the USA did not push the Bank 
of England or UK Treasury to impose controls in London. Burn interprets the 
evidence that the US authorities were concerned by the market in the early 1960s to 
suggest that they were frustrated by British reluctance to curtail it, but it is not clear 
from his account what the US wanted Britain to do.34  The official view was that the 
US economy was vulnerable to short term capital movements of many kinds including 
the Eurodollar market, and that this problem could not be contained effectively 
through further restrictions.  On the plus side, the market had increased overseas 
borrowing of US$, thus relaxing pressure on the New York market directly.  By 1970, 
the view of the President’s National Advisory Committee on International Monetary 
Affairs was that the market was a symptom rather than a cause of instability between 
national markets and that: 
‘it would not be possible to achieve tight controls on the access of US banks, 
companies, or investors to foreign short term financial markets (including the 
Eurodollar market).35
 
     This section has examined the regulatory response of the supplier and the host of 
the Eurodollar market.  The financial innovation had not been anticipated and reaction 
was slow in London. The cozy informal networks that had developed in London from 
the 19th century encouraged the Bank of England to continue to rely on personal 
contacts and ‘moral suasion’ despite the fact that the market was changing 
dramatically with the arrival of US banks.  The US Fed was uncertain about the 
impact of the market on their balance of payments, but found London’s facilities 
eased domestic pressure to relax capital controls and tight money.  Both sets of 
regulators at this point also recognised that this innovation marked a new era of 
complexity in international finance that was no longer as amenable to national 
controls.  Moreover, the Bank of England was clearly sensitive to the dangers of 
regulatory competition between international financial centres.  The over-riding 
priority for both governments was minimising balance of payments deficits and the 
market had a role to play in this campaign on both sides of the Atlantic. 
     In continental Europe, the commitment to stable exchange rates strengthened 
during the 1960s because the process of European integration increased the 
opportunity costs of fluctuating rates. Germany, with its balance of payments surplus, 
was traditionally the most liberal regime, having abolished controls on outflows as 
early as 1957, but they reintroduced controls on inflows during the 1960s.  
Switzerland became among the most restrictive regimes to prevent the 
internationalisation of the Swiss franc.  France began and ended the period more 
restrictive than many other European countries but had a brief period of liberalisation 
in 1968.  The goal of monetary integration should have led to intra-European 
liberalisation, but in practice domestic monetary sovereignty reigned supreme and 
controls were maintained.  Most countries operated a combination of reserve 
requirements on Eurodollar deposits and prohibition of interest on short-term foreign 
deposits.  Obstfeld and Taylor note briefly that France and Italy tightened some 
controls after 1973 to retain exchange rate stability, but this does not fully capture the 
widespread affinity for capital controls in Europe.36  The conflict between capital 
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controls and the European integration project was not finally resolved until 1990 with 
the abandonment of remaining controls in favour of the creation of a single market.  
This finally signalled a new solution to the trilemma for Europe with the 
abandonment of policy sovereignty and the creation of a single European central 
bank. Despite monetary union, however, the abandonment of national policy 
sovereignty and institutional barriers to cross-border capital account transactions 
remains controversial. 37   
     The relatively lax regulation of off-shore international finance in London prompted 
central bankers in Europe to urge London to impose controls on the Eurodollar 
market.  These efforts foundered over the conflict between national sovereignty and 
international cooperation, the interests of London and Washington in the continuation 
of the market, the danger of pushing it to a less well supervised off-shore financial 
centre, and a lack of consensus over its impact on national and international economic 
systems.  Efforts to improve transparency and supervision were stymied by the 
priority central banks gave to the privacy of their clients’ business. It would take the 
1982 LDC Debt Crisis for central banks and the banking community to begin to 
overcome this inhibition and start to embrace transparency, although obstacles to 
communication between national financial regulators continued to plague efforts at 
prudential supervision through the 1980s and 1990s. 
     The BIS was the ideal forum for this discussion.  It used the market in its banking 
relations with member central banks, and it was a regular meeting place for central 
bankers away from their governments.38   In June 1962 Guindey of the BIS sent a 
letter to member central banks suggesting a meeting of officials to discuss the market. 
The BIS observed that ‘looked at strictly as a competitive phenomenon and as a 
service to both the lenders and borrowers who use it, the Eurodollar market would 
appear a useful development. Are there disadvantages or dangers which should be set 
on the other side of the ledger?’ such as counteracting monetary policy, dangers of a 
liquidity crisis in the market, impact on forward exchange markets. They concluded 
with the question; ‘is it right for the central banks to leave the Eurocurrency markets 
without supervision or management?’39  The meeting of experts merely skated over 
these fundamental questions and concentrated instead on the exchange of statistics.40
     Central bank governors met in December 1963, just after the Ira Haupte crisis and 
their views show a lack of detailed understanding combined with general suspicion of 
the market. Hayes of the USA worried about over-extension of credit to a few 
borrowers and ‘inadequate checking between countries of the credit-worthiness of 
borrowers’. 41 He was still uncertain of the impact on the US balance of payments. 
Blessing noted that ‘the Bundesbank was not concerned about the participation of the 
German commercial banks in the Eurodollar market’.  He felt that the market had 
similar problems as for all short-term international credit ‘but he felt that the 
Eurodollar market had encouraged foreign bankers to be less cautious than they would 
normally be in granting foreign credits’.  Brunet of the Banque de France remarked 
that ‘he could not say whether the market was good or bad but that the central banks 
were justified in regarding it with a certain amount of suspicion…On the other hand, 
he thought there was no necessity for rigid controls.’42  Cromer of the Bank of 
England was unworried by the market. Summing up the discussion, Holtrop 
concluded that ‘the general view seemed to be that there might be problems in 
connection with the Eurodollar market but that they were not essentially different 
from the problems that existed in relation to international short term capital 
movements in general’.  The BIS initiative then focussed on the collection of statistics 
for the next couple of years. 
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     After the Haupte affair, the Bank of England recommended that the BIS should 
collect and publish statistics of the geographical destination of Eurodollar loans for 
the ‘general health of the Eurodollar market’.43  This idea was not taken up since data 
were not easily available from banks.  In February 1965 most central bank officials 
viewed publishing eurocurrency statistics as an inroad on the confidentiality of bank 
business, but the central bank governors nonetheless called for the experts to examine 
‘concrete possibilities of centralising on an international level information on bank 
credits to non-residents’ to include eurodollar loans as well as other credits.44  Such 
information was a necessary prerequisite to prudential supervision. 
     The experts duly met in April 1965 to discuss two possibilities, a genuine 
international risk centre, or merely the collection of national data without the 
formation of a new institution.  France, Italy and Germany each had their own risk 
centres and believed that most legal and administrative differences in their approaches 
could be overcome to allow data to be communicated to a new international 
institution. But the other countries were opposed.45 The British representative was 
adamant that British law did not permit the creation of such a centre. The Dutch also 
saw no scope for a new institution. Their central bank received information on use of 
credits by clients but this information was for exclusive use of the central bank. 
Sweden received no information officially and did not believe Swedish banks would 
cooperate.  The Fed claimed to receive a lot of information from private banks but 
nothing on individual borrowers. US companies were so big they often went to more 
than one bank and it was natural to expect that the banks would exchange 
information, making any official institution redundant. Swiss banks refused even to 
exchange information amongst themselves, so there was no possibility of contributing 
to a risk centre.  Given the general antipathy to the idea of a new institution, the 
experts agreed to recommend the less ambitious plan to report all external credits in 
foreign and domestic currency to the BIS along the lines of existing Eurodollar 
reporting.46  
       Multilateral regulation of the market resurfaced at the BIS at the beginning of 
1971 after a reduction in US interest rates prompted a massive capital flow into 
Europe.  A group of experts met in February to discuss the prospects for a more 
interventionist approach due to fears that the market was inflationary and interfered 
with domestic monetary policy.  However, there was still no consensus that 
restrictions in the market were advisable.47   The US and the UK were still the most 
opposed to intervention. Daane, of the Fed, argued along the lines of the NAC 
position quoted above that existing problems of the short-term capital market did not 
arise from the Eurodollar market alone.  The US wanted the BIS to pursue a technical 
approach rather than developing policy. The US authorities, nevertheless, were not 
wary of exerting national controls on the market to contain its inflationary impact at 
home.  From January 1971 the marginal reserve requirement on Eurodollar 
borrowings by US banks (Regulation D) was increased from 10% to 20%.  
      The British remained resistant to regulation, either collective or national.  Hollom 
of the Bank of England stated he ‘would be reluctant to say that the market would be 
much helped by placing restrictions on its activities. If they [the Bank of England] 
were to do that, they might drive the market into other channels’ which would be even 
more difficult to monitor.  On the other hand, Emminger of Bundesbank and Baffi of 
the Banca d’Italia both remarked on how the market interfered with the effectiveness 
of monetary policy and wanted to examine of how central banks could influence it 
collectively.  Theron of the Banque de France and Hayami of the Bank of Japan both 
advised that they protected their markets from capital inflows through national 
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exchange controls.  Hay of Banque Nationale Suisse was the most certain of the 
inflationary impact, estimating the multiplier at 2.5 and complaining about the 
interference with domestic policy. However, he did not support regulation. Instead 
‘what was needed was an attempt to get at the root of the problem, i.e. the [deficit] 
position of the US’.   
     A consensus eventually emerged that the market was inflationary but since there 
was no agreement on controlling private banks’ access to the market, the logical 
progression was to restrict central bank deposits.48  At a meeting of experts in April 
1971, the mood was irritable, with some resisting the constraints on central bank 
freedom that this would involve and others wondering if it was worthwhile since only 
the G10 banks would be bound by any such agreement. Morse, of the Bank of 
England, conceded that there were strong arguments against a permanent ban on 
central banks using the eurodollar market, however, he noted three rather despairing 
benefits from the G10 making a public statement pledging not to use the market for 
the time being: ‘one was that they might influence some [other] European central 
banks and the other was that there was a lot of agitation going on for something to be 
done about the Eurodollar market and it might be a good idea, therefore to feed those 
who were calling for action with something. In addition, they would have at least 
something to say that they had been doing in their meetings’.49  The G10’s self-
denying ordinance did not include the OPEC countries that were soon to flood the 
international capital markets with their surpluses.  In 1974 the Committee of Twenty 
of the IMF also proposed limiting state use of the eurocurrency markets, but the 
proposal was never formally adopted.50  The competitive returns in the form of 
liquidity and high interest rates were too tempting.        
      Having achieved a standstill on central bank deposits, the Standing Committee 
returned to the more thorny issue of regulating or restricting the eurodollar market, 
but here no consensus was reached.51   Daane of the Fed argued that in terms of the 
international financial and monetary crisis, the Eurodollar market was not ‘the villain 
of the piece’.52 Emminger and Kessler, however, believed that the 1971 crisis made 
multilateral regulation of the Euromarkets even more pressing, Kessler going so far as 
to say that failure to deal with the problem would threaten the newly re-established 
pegged exchange rate system.  The resulting report of the standing committee to the 
Governors in March 1972 reflected this disagreement about the depth of the problem 
and its possible solutions.  The Governors deemed it too weak to serve as the basis of 
policy decisions and referred the question back to the committee.53   
     Acrimonious discussion continued for the next six months.  McMahon of the Bank 
of England supported national approaches to the market, essentially endorsing the 
status quo of exchange controls on the Continent that benefited the City of London.  
Emminger argued that EEC members could not accept regulation on a purely national 
basis since they were concurrently discussing monetary union.54  The EEC set up a 
Contact Group of national banking supervisors in 1972 to develop co-operation and to 
exchange information on banking supervision, but progress was slow.  It was not until 
the end of 1977 that they published their First Directive to co-ordinate laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of credit institutions.  Meanwhile, at the BIS and at the 
IMF Germany advocated reserve requirements on Eurodollar deposits but the British 
reiterated that this would merely push the market to a more hospitable international 
financial centre.55  US representatives remained preoccupied with official depositors 
and went so far as to challenge why so many central banks kept deposits with the BIS 
at all.56   
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     At their meeting on 10 February 1973, amidst disarray in the financial markets, no 
consensus could be reached among officials. 57 In the end Larre, as chair, remarked 
that ‘this was not a very propitious day for discussing the question of the regulation of 
the Eurocurrency market’ given large flows of short-term capital that were mostly not 
Eurodollar flows. It was agreed that Larre should produce a mainly factual report in 
his own name for the Committee of 20 at the beginning of March 1973.58   
     The deliberations of the Eurocurrency Standing Committee revealed irreconcilable 
differences over how serious the market had affected domestic monetary policy and 
destabilised capital flows, and secondly what controls were necessary or feasible.  At 
their meeting in May 1974, the Governors still could not agree on these issues and 
multilateral regulation was not achieved.  
     The case of the Eurodollar market showed that the complexity of international 
financial flows made it increasingly difficult to formulate effective regulatory 
responses.  This was due to disputes about the economic impact of the new market as 
well as the challenge of enforcing any regulation given the complexity of the 
transactions involved.  Moreover, the supervision of the market focussed attention on 
the conflict between the benefits of transparency and the costs to business of a loss of 
privacy.  In 1974 floating exchange rates and the oil crisis added to the supervisory 
challenges of multinational banking and increasingly complex financial markets.  
Attention soon turned from regulating the Eurodollar market to promoting the 
stability of multinational banking generally. 
 
III 
       With the advent of floating exchange rates, doubts about the soundness of many new 
small and medium-sized banks in the Eurodollar market prompted the emergence of a 
tiered interest rate structure in the spring and summer of 1974. 59  Small banks faced a 
liquidity squeeze as the market contracted, causing the failure of the Herstatt Bank.60 
The market panicked and the rate on three-month Eurodollar loans soared to an 
unprecedented 14% in mid-July. At the end of September the New York Reserve Bank 
had to take over the foreign exchange obligations of Franklin National Bank.61  The 
contrast between the willingness of the Bundesbank to allow the failure of the Herstatt 
and the Fed’s support of the Franklin highlighted the inconsistency of international 
practices of lender of last resort.  The Bank of England took no responsibility for the 
solvency of subsidiaries of foreign banks in London and so the Israel-British Bank was 
allowed to fail in July 1974 with outstanding debts of £43m.62   
     Ten years after the American ‘invasion’ of the city of London, this crisis prompted 
efforts to co-ordinate lender of last resort facilities to international banks. In 
September, the Central Bank Governors of the G10 announced that, although detailed 
rules governing lender of last resort to the eurodollar market were not practical, the 
market should be reassured that ‘means are available for that purpose and will be used 
if and when necessary’.63 They also set up the Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices in Basle, chaired first by George Blunden and then by Peter 
Cooke, both of the Bank of England, an institution notorious for its light regulatory 
hand.   
     While international regulation stalled, national regulatory changes went ahead.  In the 
City, the Bank of England urged consortium banks to set out formally in letters to the 
Bank of England that their shareholders would agree to act as lenders of last resort.  
Foreign banks were asked similarly for commitments that they would support their 
UK subsidiaries, although these undertakings were not enforceable.64 At the same 
time the Fed announced that it was ready to act as lender of last resort for member 
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banks to protect them against abrupt withdrawal of petro-dollars or any other deposits. 
Together, these measures reassured the market and the tiered interest rate structure 
contracted early in 1975 as confidence returned.   
       Ten years earlier, similar crises in Europe related to the Eurodollar market had 
been contained through informal and ad hoc advice.  By 1973/4 the volume of capital 
flows, greater public sensitivity to the interests of depositors, and UK membership of 
the EEC required a more formal response. In addition to the traditional personal 
meetings with individual bank officers, London banks had to make more detailed and 
continuous statistical reports to enhance prudential supervision.  At the end of 1974, 
the Bank of England sent a letter to all banks in the City advising them to tighten up 
their internal control systems, particularly the control of foreign exchange operations 
by branches and subsidiaries overseas.  This was the first time such a formal public 
instruction had been made.  The Bank of England also required London’s British 
Overseas Banks for the first time to report the activities of their overseas offices. 
Blunden noted that ‘the reaction of most banks to our letter has suggested to us that 
we were right in judging that the banking community as a whole was ready for us to 
take this new line.’ Blunden, nevertheless, promised ‘our approach remains flexible, 
personal, progressive and participative.’65
     The Basle Committee Concordat in 1975 set out the supervisory responsibility for 
multinational banks, concluding that solvency of foreign branches was ‘essentially a 
matter for parent supervisory authorities’, while foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures 
lay within the responsibility of the host authorities.66  The subsequent recommendation 
of 1978 that solvency should be based on consolidated accounts put greater emphasis on 
parent authorities to ensure the collection and publication of this information. The 
Concordat was further amended in 1983 to emphasize the need for cooperation and 
communication between host and parent supervisory bodies, which was elaborated in 
recommendations in 1990.  The collapse of BCCI led to renewed calls for supervision of 
multinational banks and the Concordat recommendations were formalised into minimum 
standards in 1992, but enforcement was still problematic. The 1992 amendments shifted 
responsibility back to the host to ensure that parent countries had adequate supervisory 
structures.  Banks were to seek permission for cross border expansion from both host 
and parent regulators.  These amendments further emphasized international information 
flows, but by 1996 the BIS recognised that information was not passing easily from 
some hosts (particularly off-shore financial centres) to the parent supervisory bodies.   
     The Basle Committee also considered how it could help with risk management, 
perhaps through central agencies that collected information on total liabilities of 
particular borrowers that could be accessed by potential lenders.  As in the early 
1970s, the problem of customer confidentiality and the different standards of 
disclosure among the various jurisdictions made this impossible.67  Instead, the BIS 
reported quarterly data on countries’ total external debt and from 1978 included 
maturity distribution on a half-yearly basis.  From December the Bank of England 
published the consolidated exposure of banks in the UK.  In May 1982 the Basle 
Committee finally agreed on guidelines on country-risk for banks to consider – just in 
time for the LDC debt crisis of that year. 
    The progress of these efforts at international co-ordination was limited by the 
problems that still confront those seeking to develop global financial standards; 
different political, legal and institutional structures of financial systems and an 
antipathy to harmonisation.  As noted above, the EEC harmonisation programme, 
surely most suited to supranational co-ordination, made little progress in the 1970s. At 
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the International Banking Summer School of 1977 Blunden expressed the Bank of 
England’s dim view of such efforts.  
The banking system of a country is central to the management and efficiency 
of its economy; its supervision will inevitably be a jealously guarded national 
prerogative. Its subordination to an international authority is a highly unlikely 
development, which would require a degree of political commitment which 
neither exists nor is conceivable in the foreseeable future.68
 
     After relatively smooth sailing from 1975-77, international bank lending surged 
again in 1978 and coincided with a run on the US$ in the second half of the year.  Into 
this volatile environment the Iranian revolution sparked off the second oil crisis at the 
end of 1979.  Bank lending as a proportion of LDC debt rose from 15% in 1970 to 
27% in 1980, contributing to the Latin American Debt Crisis of 1982.  The prudential 
regulation introduced in the 1970s proved inadequate to cope with these pressures, 
particularly on the assessment of country risk, and the transparency of syndicated 
lending.  
     At the end of 1987 the Basel Committee issued a consultative paper on capital 
adequacy with minimum standards for international banks. The focus of their 
deliberations reflected the major preoccupation at the time; sovereign default risk.69  
After six months of consultation the proposals were adopted with some minor changes 
and were implemented by many banking regulators by 1992.  The failure of the Capital 
Adequacy Requirements to forestall the series of financial crises in the 1990s led to a 
reassessment of risk weightings, in particular since they had been designed mainly with 
sovereign risk in mind (since this was the problem of the 1980s) rather than risk of 
private borrowers (which was the case in the Asian Financial Crisis).70  Basle II also 
tries to emphasise prudential supervision and better disclosure, partly due to the 
increased sensitivity to money-laundering in the wake of the US ‘War on Terror’. These 
events renewed efforts by the BIS and the IMF, as well as national regulators, to target 
financial stability.71 The focus remains, however, primarily on national application and 
enforcement, and the future application of Basle II remains uncertain for many nations.   
 
IV 
This analysis has highlighted the development of multilateral regulation and 
supervision of international financial markets by focussing on the Eurodollar market 
and multinational banking in the 1960s and 1970s as the most important financial 
innovations of this period.  These cases reveal the longevity of current obstacles to 
cooperative international efforts.  International finance has remained regulated on a 
national basis because of practical obstacles to information flows and the dangers of 
pushing markets to more fragile and poorly supervised off-shore centres, as well as an 
ideological lack of consensus over the costs and benefits of globalisation, and the 
perceived threat to national sovereignty.  These obstacles to cooperation derive from 
the origins of late 20th century globalisation and were as apparent in the 1960s as they 
have been over the last decade.  Efforts at cooperative or collaborative supervision 
and regulation are most commonly found after a crisis when an international event has 
threatened national financial systems.  This has resulted in the focus of these new 
guidelines being backward looking and reactive rather than pro-active.  Moreover, as 
each crisis recedes, so does the impetus for regulatory reform. 
        International finance became extraordinarily more complex and surged in 
volume relative to ‘real’ economies in the 1980s and 1990s.  However, the seeds of 
the basic obstacle to cooperative efforts at prudential regulation were already apparent 
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in this earlier era of financial innovation.  These debates set the precedent for the 
priority of national over collective interest in the absence of clear evidence that 
globalisation threatened systemic failures.  The global financial crisis of 2007-9 
dramatically exposed the weaknesses of this approach to international financial 
regulation, although the responses to the crisis have also demonstrated how difficult 
these obstacles are to overcome. 
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